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Abstract
Cognitive hierarchy theory, a collection of structural models of non-equilibrium
thinking, in which players’ best responses rely on heterogeneous beliefs on others’
strategies including na¨ıve behavior, proved powerful in explaining observations from a
wide range of games. We introduce an inclusive cognitive hierarchy model, in which
players do not rule out the possibility of facing opponents at their own thinking level.
Our theoretical results show that inclusiveness is crucial for asymptotic properties of
deviations from equilibrium behavior in expansive games. We show that the limiting
behaviors are categorized in three distinct types: na¨ıve, Savage rational with incon-
sistent beliefs, and sophisticated. We test the model in a laboratory experiment of
collective decision-making. The data suggests that inclusiveness is indispensable with
regard to explanatory power of the models of hierarchical thinking.
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1 Introduction
Models of non-equilibrium strategic thinking have been proposed to explain structural devia-
tions from equilibrium in a variety of games. A sizable part of bounded rationality literature
is devoted to the models of cognitive hierarchy, starting with the level-k (L) model due to
Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995), which allow for heterogeneity among players in
levels of strategic thinking. In the level-k model, a foundational level (level-0) represents
a strategically na¨ıve initial approach to a game, and a level-k player (hereafter Lk), where
k ≥ 1, is assumed to best respond to others with level k − 1.1
Closely related, the cognitive hierarchy (CH) model introduced by Camerer et al. (2004)
allows for heterogeneity in the beliefs on others’ levels. For each k ≥ 1, a level-k player best
responds to a mixture of strictly lower levels, induced by the truncation up to level k − 1
from the underlying level distribution, which is either obtained from maximum likelihood
estimations applied to data, or calibrated from previous estimates. Experimental studies
provide evidence that the CH model delivers a better fit for explaining the actual behavior
of players in certain games.2 See Crawford et al. (2013) for a review of applications of L and
CH models.
Common to these models is the assumption that level-k players do not assign any prob-
ability to levels higher than or equal to k, which is proposed as an embodiment of the
understanding that the cognitive limits have a hierarchical structure. This entails that the
possibility for players to assign positive probability to the events in which other players have
the same cognitive level as themselves is ruled out. That is, self-awareness, as described in
Camerer et al. (2004), is precluded.3
In this paper, we propose an inclusive cognitive hierarchy (ICH) model, in which players
are allowed to project themselves to others in regard to their cognitive level. The ICH model
thus allows for inclusiveness while maintaining the hierarchical structure of cognitive levels
and the partial consistency induced by truncation of the underlying level distribution. We
study the role of inclusiveness both theoretically and empirically. We provide theorems that
describe asymptotic properties of the deviation from rational behavior and present results
from a laboratory experiment on collective decision-making.
There are at least three reasons why we believe the consequences of inclusiveness should
be studied. First, the observed limitations of existing models in the extant literature on
strategic thinking4 call for studies with an explicit focus on inclusiveness, for which our
1Betting games (Brocas et al., 2014), auctions (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b), and coordination games
(Crawford et al., 2008) are examples of the games for which L model explains well the experimental data.
2Lottery games (O¨stling et al., 2011), coordination games (Costa-Gomes et al., 2009), action commitment
games (Carvalho and Santos-Pinto, 2014), and minimizer game (Berger et al., 2016) are among the games
where CH model proved powerful in explaining the experimental data.
3 Although it is the term used in the literature, “self-awareness” should not be confounded with the
capacity for introspection often meant by in, for example, psychology. What is meant here is the capacity
for projecting the self to others, which has little to do with introspection.
4 Camerer et al. (2004, fn. 15) points to that CH fails in certain games in Stahl and Wilson (1995) and
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experimental analysis provides a clear support. Second, our analytical results imply that
inclusiveness lead to substantially different predictions in a certain class of games (Theorems
1 and 2). A novel finding of this paper is that without inclusiveness, the deviation from
rational behavior asymptotically diverges away without a bound, which, we argue, is not
coherent with the spirit of the cognitive hierarchy models.5 Third, our post-experimental
questionnaire also suggests that inclusiveness is indispensable.6 Figure 3(a) in Appendix
A shows that a fairly large proportion (96%) of our subjects exhibit a positive degree of
inclusiveness: ‘sometimes’, ‘most of the time’, or ‘always’. When asked for a subjective
estimation of the percentage among others who used the ‘same reasoning’ (Figure 3(b)), their
responses vary and a majority are far from 0%, which suggests that ruling out inclusiveness
would be too extreme as an assumption.7
We show in Section 3 that inclusiveness matters the most in games in which the best
response function is expansive. On the other hand, most of the remarkable results in the
literature of strategic thinking are based on games such as the beauty contest games, market
entry games, coordination games, centipede games, and so on, that fall outside of this class.
Dominance solvable games can be considered within the class of non-expansive games, in the
sense that the infinite iteration of applying the best-response function leads to a convergence
to the Nash equilibrium. When this iteration leads to the unique Nash equilibrium, it
corresponds to the high-level strategies converging to it. Such a property is often considered
to fit well the idea that the deviation from Nash due to limited cognitive ability of the
low-level players dissipates as the cognitive limit goes to infinity.8 Our results in Section 3
show that inclusiveness proves crucial in this regard for expansive games. As we demonstrate
empirically for the case of beauty contest games, it makes a difference in the prediction power
in other games as well.
The idea of a hybrid model with hierarchical thinking and equilibrium approaches as
in ICH is not entirely novel. Stahl and Wilson (1995) proposed “worldly” types, who best
responds to a prior based on a belief that there are level-0, level-1, and equilibrium types.
In fact, including na¨ıve players next to sophisticated ones can be dated back to the “gang
of four” (Kreps et al., 1982) type of models, such as Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Conlisk
suggest inclusiveness. Colman et al. (2014) point to the weak performance of the CH model in common
interest games. Battaglini et al. (2010) conclude that the L model does poorly, in fact, worse than equi-
librium, in explaining data from collective decision-making experiments that are similar to our experiments.
Georganas et al. (2015) argue that level-k models do not perform well in some games. See Breitmoser (2012)
for comparative studies over different models.
5Evidence from experimental studies on public good games suggest that as group size increases, individual
behavior bears convergent and stabilizing tendencies. See Isaac et al. (1994).
6As the questionnaire is not incentivized, the interpretation should be done with an extra care.
7Heterogeneity of the answers implies that the participants’ degree of inclusiveness was also heterogeneous.
This observation is coherent with the assumption of hierarchical belief structure that we describe in detail
in Section 2.
8Camerer et al. (2004) suggest inclusiveness for a set of games CH fails as iteration does not lead to Nash
equilibrium.
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(1980), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1991), and Russell and Thaler (1985). ICH picks
up this intuition and provides a structural framework based on CH.9 Furthermore, our im-
plementation of ICH is closely related to “equilibrium plus noise” approaches, which entail
either having equilibrium types next to na¨ıve types or replacing best-responses with better-
responses, i.e., noisy or biased best-responses. As theoretically demonstrated in Section 3
and further discussed in Section 6, ICH can be seen as a model in line of the former type
of models, e.g., the “instinctive” and “contemplative” typology of Rubinstein (2016) or in-
consistent beliefs in existence of irrational types held by rational types as in Kreps et al.
(1982).10
Our empirical analysis is based on lab experiments we have run on collective decision-
making. Particularly, subjects in our experiments were involved in a jury voting setup due
to Condorcet (1785), in which each juror receives an imperfectly informative signal about an
unknown binary state in order to collectively make the best decision given the aggregated
information. Since Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), the strategic considerations based on
pivotal-voting have been formally studied and Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) are the first among
the many-to-come to experimentally study how the formal model fares in explaining behavior
observed in the lab.
In our experiments, the size of the jury varied as in previous studies.11
Collective performances are correlated across challenges, as demonstrated in Woolley
et al. (2010), hence a good knowledge about the behavioral basis in collective decision-making
processes is essential in understanding the more general phenomena.
The paper proceeds as follows. We introduce the inclusive cognitive hierarchy model
formally in the following section. In Section 3, we present our main theorems, which provide
a characterization of games according to the asymptotic properties of the strategic thinking,
by focusing on the linear quadratic games. We furthermore provide a numerical comparison
of the individual behaviors and the performance of collective decisions under different spec-
ifications of the cognitive hierarchy in a game of information aggregation. In Section 4, we
9Note that best-responding to others who might play equilibrium is different than inclusiveness. Similarly,
Levin and Zhang (2019) allow level-k players in the L model to believe that there might be other level-k
players, whereas Jimenez-Gomez (2019), building on Strzalecki (2014), allows for this possibility only if
they have the exact same beliefs. Both of these papers refer to the “false consensus effect” a` la Ross et al.
(1977). Alaoui and Penta (2016), on the other hand, introduce a model of strategic thinking that endogenizes
individuals’ cognitive bounds as a result of a cost-benefit analysis. Their framework allows players to reason
about opponents whom they regard as more sophisticated as well.
10Our Nash estimation with the logistic error is also a better-response model. Thus, we do not expect
models such as quantal response equilibrium (QRE) due to McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) would do much
better than this Nash estimation. We discuss QRE further in Section 5. However, comparing CH approach
and QRE is beyond the scope of this paper.
11See Palfrey (2016) for a review of experiments in political economy, including experiments based on the
Condorcet jury model. Battaglini et al. (2008) document an increase in irrational, non-equilibrium play as
the size increases. As Camerer (2003) stresses (Ch. 7), the effect of group size on behavior in strategic
interactions is a persistent phenomenon, especially towards coordination.
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introduce our experimental design that features novelties due to our modeling concerns and
signal setup. Section 5 provides the results of the experiment, and the models are compared
in terms of the fit to the data. We conclude by summarizing our findings and presenting
further research questions in Section 6. The proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
Let (N,X, u) be a symmetric normal-form game where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
X ⊂ R is a convex set of pure strategies, and u : Xn → Rn is the payoff function, twice
differentiable. Each player forms a belief on the cognitive levels of the other players. Let
gk(h) denote the probability that a k
th-level player assigns independently for each of the
other players to belong to the hth-level.
In the standard level-k model, a na¨ıve, non-strategic behavior is specified as the initial
level (level-0, or L0). For k ≥ 1, a level-k (Lk) player holds the belief that all of the other
players belong to exactly one level below herself:
gk(h) =
{
1 if h = k − 1,
0 otherwise.
(L)
In the cognitive hierarchy model, each kth-level (CHk) player best responds to a mixture
of lower levels. Let f = (f0, f1, . . .) be a distribution over N which represents the composition
of levels. Each kth-level player holds a belief on the distribution of the other players’ levels
that is a truncation up to one level below herself:
gk (h) =
fh∑k−1
m=0 fm
, for 0 ≤ h ≤ k − 1 and k ≥ 1. (CH)
Thus, these two models share the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Strong overconfidence) gk(h) = 0 for all h ≥ k.
Assumption 1 enables us to say that what we call “levels” here indeed have a hierarchical
structure. To see this, consider gk(h) in the form of a k-h matrix. Assumption 1 implies that
the upper-diagonal entries are all zeros, and thus the remaining non-zero elements have a
pyramid structure with strictly lower-diagonal entries. Each level-k player assigns non-zero
probabilities only to the levels strictly lower than herself. In that sense, players are assumed
to be overconfident.12 Alternatively, the following assumption can be considered:
Assumption 2 (Weak overconfidence) gk(h) = 0 for all h > k.
12Camerer and Lovallo (1999) report on experimental evidence for overconfident behavior in the case of
the market entry game. When ability is a payoff-relevant variable in a strategic interaction, evidence shows
that players tend to be overconfident (see Benoˆıt and Dubra, 2011). On the other hand, Azmat et al. (2019)
find an underestimation of students’ grades in the absence of feedback.
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Assumption 2 is weaker than Assumption 1. As in Assumption 1, zero probability is
assigned for all strictly upper-diagonal entries, and thus a hierarchical structure among levels
is still preserved. However, the diagonal entries are not restricted to be zero. A level-k player
is allowed to assign a non-zero possibility for the other players to have the same level as
herself.
In what follows, we formally introduce the inclusive cognitive hierarchy (ICH) model, in
which the strong overconfidence condition is weakened to allow for inclusiveness.
2.1 Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy
Fix an integer K > 0 that prescribes the highest level considered in the model.13 In the
ICH model, we consider a sequence of mixed strategies σ = (σ0, . . . , σK), in which for each
k ∈ {1, ..., K}, σk ∈ ∆(X) is a best reply, assuming that the other players’ levels are drawn
from the truncation of the underlying distribution f up to level k. As in the other models,
we focus on level-symmetric profiles in which all players of the same level use the same mixed
strategy.
Definition 1 A sequence of level-symmetric strategies σ = (σ0, . . . , σK) is called inclusive
cognitive hierarchy strategies when there exists a distribution f over N under which
supp (σk) ⊂ arg max
xi∈X
Ex−i [u (xi, x−i) |gk, σ] , ∀k ∈ {1, · · · , K} ,
where gk is the truncated distribution induced by f such that
gk (h) =
fh∑k
m=0 fm
for h ∈ {0, · · · , k} , (ICH)
and the expectation over x−i is drawn, for each player j 6= i, from a distribution
γk (σ) :=
k∑
m=0
gk (m)σm.
Definition 1 is analogous to the definitions used in the standard level-k model and the
cognitive hierarchy model. It simply replaces the assumptions on beliefs, (L) and (CH), with
(ICH). Note that the sequence of truncated distributions g = (g1, . . . , gK) is uniquely defined
from the underlying distribution f of levels. Building on previous studies (as developed by
Camerer et al., 2004), we maintain the assumption that f follows a Poisson distribution with
coefficient τ :
fk =
τ k
k!
e−τ .
The expectation of the distribution is τ , which thus represents the overall expected level
among the players.
13We assume fi > 0 for all i ≤ K. For the truncated distribution to be well-defined, it is sufficient to
assume f0 > 0, but we restrict ourselves to the cases where all levels are present with a positive probability.
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2.2 Existence and Uniqueness
Since the definition of ICH involves the best response to a strategy which coincides with the
own strategy with a positive probability, the strategy is defined as a solution of a fixed-point
problem. We provide a set of sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness.
Let X = [x, x] ⊂ R be the strategy space allowing x = −∞ and/or x =∞.
Assumption 3 ∀xi and ∀x−i,
∂2u
∂x2i
(xi, x−i) < 0,
∂u
∂xi
(x, xi) > 0 and
∂u
∂xi
(x, xi) < 0.
Assumption 4 ∀xi and ∀xj such that i 6= j,
∂2u
∂x2i
+ (n− 1) ∂
2u
∂xi∂xj
< 0.
Assumption 3 guarantees that the best response function is well-defined, and Assumption
4 assures that its slope to be less than +1 (including any negative value). The former
provides boundary conditions for the best response function and the latter is sufficient for
uniqueness, which is closely related to the condition imposed in Angeletos and Pavan (2007)
for linear quadratic games that we investigate thoroughly in the following section. Under
these conditions, the ICH exists uniquely. The proof of the following Proposition is relegated
to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the sequence of ICH strategies (σk)
∞
k=1 is
uniquely determined for any g = (gk)
∞
k=1 and σ0.
3 Asymptotic Properties
In this section, we provide theoretical insights into implications of inclusiveness. We show
below that the distance of the L and CH strategies from the Nash equilibrium diverges,
while that of the ICH strategy is bounded (Theorem 1) for the games in which the best-
reply functions are asymptotically expanding. On the other hand, the strategies in all of
those models are bounded (Theorem 2) for the games in which the best-reply functions
are not asymptotically expanding. These analytical results suggest that whether or not
the inclusiveness condition matters in describing the asymptotic behavior depends on the
asymptotic property of the best-reply functions.
For the sake of tractability, we focus on linear quadratic games (Currarini and Feri (2015))
which have desirable features for our analysis. First, they are fully aggregative games (Cornes
and Hartley (2012)), in which the payoff of each player is affected by the action profile of the
players through the aggregate of the strategies of all players and her own strategy. This fits
well to our current objective, as our goal here is to understand analytically how the optimal
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strategy of a player would be affected by the belief over the type of the other players. The
fact that the strategy of the other players appears explicitly as a term in an aggregative form
allows us to obtain straightforward insights on the relationship between the shape of the
best-reply functions and the players’ beliefs over the strategies of the other players. Second,
in a more technical convenience, linear quadratic games have a property such that, when
a player holds a stochastic belief over the strategies of the other players, the maximizer of
her expected payoff coincides with the best reply against the pure strategy which takes the
expected value of the aggregate. This is because the linearity of the derivative allows us to
switch the order of the partial derivative and the expectation. Then, facing heterogeneous
beliefs over the other players’ strategies, our analysis can simply focus on the best reply
against the expectation of the beliefs, which provides us with a high tractability of the
models.14
Consider n individuals, each of whom takes an action xi ∈ R. The payoff of player i in
a linear quadratic game is a function of her own action xi and the aggregate of the other
players’ actions X−i =
∑
j 6=i xj in the following form:
ui (xi, X−i) = λtx+ xtΓx (1)
where x = (xi X−i)
t, λ = (λx λX)
t and
Γ =
(
γ11 γ12
γ12 γ22
)
.
There are several games of interest which fall into the class of linear quadratic games.
Example 1 (A simple quadratic game) Suppose ui (xi, x−i) = −
(∑
j xj
)2
. Then, λt =
(0 0) and
Γ =
( −1 −1
−1 −1
)
.
Example 2 (Cournot competition) Consider a Cournot competition. Suppose that the in-
verse demand function is linear P (Q) = a− bQ, and each firm has a constant marginal cost
ci. Let qi be the quantity produced by firm i and Q−i :=
∑
j 6=i qj. The profit of firm i is:
Πi = qi (a− b (qi +Q−i)− ci) .
Then, λt = (a− ci 0) and
Γ =
( −b − b
2
− b
2
0
)
.
14Obtained insights could be extended to a game with more general payoff functions, to the extent that
the second-degree Taylor expansion of the payoff function with respect to the aggregate strategy provides an
approximation.
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Example 3 (Keynesian beauty contest games) Suppose that each of n players chooses a
number xi simultaneously, and each player’s payoff is quadratic with respect to the distance
between her own choice and the average of all players’ choices multiplied by a constant p ∈
(0, 1). Then,
ui (xi, X−i) = −
(
xi − p
(
xi +X−i
n
))2
.
Then, λt = (0 0) and
Γ =
(
− (1− p
n
)2 (
1− p
n
)
p
n(
1− p
n
)
p
n
− ( p
n
)2
)
.
Example 4 (Public good provision game) Suppose that each agent contributes xi to a public
good and the cost is quadratic:
ui (xi, X−i) = θi (xi +X−i)− cix2i .
Then, λt = (θi θi) and
Γ =
( −ci 0
0 0
)
.
We impose some regularity conditions on the linear quadratic game in the form (1). First,
we assume γ11 < 0. This implies that ui has a unique maximizer for any X−i and thus the
best-reply function is well-defined. It is straightforward to show that the game defined by
(1) has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium:
x∗ := − λx
2 (γ11 + (n− 1) γ12) .
We assume that the denominator is non-zero so that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is
well-defined. By applying a parallel transformation yi := xi − x∗, (1) becomes:
ui = λ
tx+ xtΓx = λtyy + y
tΓy + c
where Y−i =
∑
j 6=i yj, y = (yi Y−i)
t, λy = (0 λY )
t , and λY and c are independent of y.
As the terms λtyy = λY Y−i and c have no strategic consequence on player i’s behavior (i.e.
the best-reply function of player i is unaffected), we can assume λY = 0 and c = 0 without
loss of generality. Therefore, in the following, we focus our attention on the games with the
payoff function:
ui = y
tΓy, (2)
with γ11 < 0 and γ11 +(n− 1) γ12 6= 0 (as in Angeletos and Pavan (2007)). Notice that there
is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium y∗i = 0 for all i.
The first-order condition of player i is:
∂ui
∂yi
= 2γ11yi + 2γ12Y−i.
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When player i holds a stochastic belief over the strategies of the other players, the aggregate
of the other players’ strategies is a random variable Y˜−i. Since the first-order condition is
linear in Y−i in quadratic games, the best reply against a mixed-strategy profile coincides
with the best reply against the aggregate strategy which takes deterministically the expected
value of the random variable:
BRi
(
Y˜−i
)
= −γ12
γ11
E
[
Y˜−i
]
. (3)
In order to describe asymptotic properties, we consider a sequence of linear quadratic
games in which the number of players increases. More precisely, let G (n) = 〈n,R, (uni )ni=1〉
be a normal-form game with n players where the set of pure strategies is fixed as the set of
real numbers R,15 and uni is the payoff function of player i which satisfies (2). We analyze
asymptotic properties of the strategies under the sequence of games {G (n)}∞n=2.
Remember that the three models under our scrutiny here, L, CH and ICH, differ only
in the assumption imposed on players’ beliefs on the types of the other players. For each
model, the strategy in each level is defined in the same way as in Definition 1. The only
difference is that the frequency gk (h), assigned in the belief of a level-k player to the event
in which each of the other players should be level-h, is specified by the equation (ICH) in
Section 2 in the ICH model, but it is replaced by (L) (resp. (CH)) in the L (resp. CH)
model. It is worth emphasizing that our results in this section do not hinge on the Poisson
assumption concerning the underlying distribution fk. We consider a sequence of level-
symmetric strategies σ = (σk)k≥0 where for each k ≥ 1, σk maximizes the expected payoff
under the belief gk (h) (Definition 1).
For each game G (n) and in each of the three models, the level-0 strategy σ0 is exogenously
given, allowing the possibility of a mixed strategy. In order to make the comparison explicit
across the models for k ≥ 1, we add a superscript which represents the model, such as σLk ,
σCHk , and σ
ICH
k . Note that, by (3), σ
M
k (n) are all pure strategies for k ≥ 1 for each model
M ∈ {L,CH, ICH}.
We assume that the following limit exists, allowing infinity:
A := lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣γ12γ11n
∣∣∣∣ ∈ R≥0 ∪ {∞} .
Remember that −γ12
γ11
is the slope of the best-reply function (3). Since Y˜−i is the sum of the
strategies of the other players, A is the limit of the slope of player i’s best-reply function, as
a function of the average of the other players.
First, we consider the case A =∞. In such games, we say that the sequence of the games
is asymptotically expanding, denoting the property that the sensitivity of one’s strategy to
15The assumption of the one-dimensional, unbounded strategy space allows us to obtain clear insights on
the convergence and/or divergence of the strategies. In the games with a compact, one-dimensional strategy
space, these insights could be inherited with some adjustments, e.g. divergence corresponds to a bang-bang
corner solution.
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the average strategy of the other players increases without a bound. We call such games as
expansive games. We show that the strategies diverge from the Nash equilibrium in the L
and the CH models, while it is bounded in the ICH model.
Theorem 1 Consider a sequence of games {G (n)}∞n=2 in which the payoff functions satisfy
(2) for each n. Consider any σ0 and let µ := E [σ0]. Suppose A = ∞. For any µ 6=
0, limn→∞
∣∣σLk (n)∣∣ = ∞ and limn→∞ ∣∣σCHk (n)∣∣ = ∞, while limn→∞ ∣∣σICH1 (n)∣∣ < ∞ and
limn→∞
∣∣σICHk (n)∣∣ = 0 for all k ≥ 2.
Among the examples described above, the sequence {G (n)}∞n=2 is asymptotically ex-
panding (A = ∞) in the simple quadratic game (Example 1) and in the linear Cournot
competition (Example 2). A common feature of these games is that the aggregate of all
players’ strategies enters into each player’s payoff in a way that the aggregate term does not
dissipate for large n. When A = ∞, we show that the behaviors in the ICH model show a
stark contrast with those in the L or in the CH model. The presence of the inclusiveness
condition thus leads to an intrinsic difference in the prediction. Moreover, we show that the
ICH strategy converges to the Nash equilibrium for any level k ≥ 2.
Theorem 1 implies that for asymptotically expanding games, there are fundamentally
three degrees of strategic sophistication: na¨ıve (level-0), partially sophisticated (level-1), and
highly sophisticated (level-2 or more). Since the strategies of level-2 or higher all converge to
the Nash equilibrium, behaviors in this class of games fall into one of the following three cases
asymptotically: (i) na¨ıve strategy that does not maximize the expected payoff, (ii) level-1
strategy that maximizes the payoff under an inconsistent belief, and (iii) fully sophisticated
strategy that maximizes the payoff under the consistent belief. This is in line with Camerer
et al. (2004) and Crawford et al. (2013), who point to that in many games there are no more
than three levels of hierarchical thinking observed, and with Rubinstein (2016), who argues
for prevalence of a two-type (instinctive and contemplative) typology. In a sense, ICH is a
middle-way integrating these two sets of observations.
Now, consider a sequence of games which satisfies the same conditions assumed in The-
orem 1, except for that on A.
Theorem 2 Suppose A < ∞. For any µ, ∣∣σLk (n)∣∣ , ∣∣σCHk (n)∣∣ , and ∣∣σICHk (n)∣∣ are all
bounded as n→∞, for all k ≥ 1.
In the standard Keynesian beauty contest games (Example 3), we have:
A = lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− p
n
)
p
n
n
− (1− p
n
)2
∣∣∣∣∣ = p <∞.
In the games with A < ∞, the slope of the best-reply function is bounded as n goes to
infinity. Hence, even in a game with a large number of players, the optimal strategy of a
player does not diverge. In the beauty contest games, we see that the aggregate term is
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relevant in each player’s payoff to the degree of the average of all players. Table 1 shows
the comparison of the L, CH, and ICH models fitting to the data in beauty contest games
studied in Bosch-Dome`nech et al. (2002).16 We observe that the ICH model fits better than
L and CH by comparing second moments (that is, matching the means to estimate models
lead to standard deviations that are closer to the data for ICH compared to L or CH).
Data L CH ICH
Name N mean s.d. τ s.d. τ s.d. τ s.d.
Lab 86 35.1 19.6 1.06 12.4 1.31 9.6 0.90 12.9
Classroom 138 26.8 17.7 1.90 12.7 2.53 8.6 1.51 14.1
Take-home 119 25.2 17.0 2.11 12.5 2.85 8.3 1.65 14.2
Theorists 54 17.8 24.3 3.46 10.4 5.15 6.0 2.42 14.3
Conference 92 16.8 20.1 3.72 9.9 5.64 5.6 2.54 14.3
E-mail 150 22.2 20.7 2.56 11.9 3.58 7.5 1.93 14.3
Newspapers 7893 23.1 20.2 2.41 12.1 3.34 7.7 1.85 14.3
Table 1: Method of moments estimation of beauty contest games studied in Bosch-Dome`nech
et al. (2002). Following Camerer et al. (2004), the Poisson coefficient τ is estimated by
matching the first moments.
3.1 Condorcet Jury Theorem
In order to highlight the difference of the asymptotic behaviors between the games with
A = ∞ and A < ∞, we now pay specific attention to a game of collective decision-making
in a standard setting of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The game fits well to the objectives
of our analysis here, because (i) it falls in the class in which the best response function is
an expansion mapping, therefore allows us to provide a contrast to the analysis we provide
above for the beauty contest games, (ii) asymptotic behavior of the players as n becomes
large is often the center of the analysis and is thus well-documented in the literature, and
(iii) with an obvious real-life application, the game is simple enough to be understood by
non-economists, and therefore it is opt for experimental studies at laboratory, which we
provide in Section 4.
A group of n individuals makes a binary collective decision d ∈ {−1, 1}. The true state
of the world is also binary, ω ∈ {−1, 1}, with a common prior of equal probabilities. The
payoff is a function of the realized state and the collective decision as follows:
u˜(ω, d) =

0 if ω 6= d,
q if ω = d = 1,
1− q if ω = d = −1,
16We express our gratitude to Rosemarie Nagel for providing us with the data.
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with q ∈ (0, 1) for all individuals.17 Each individual i ∈ {1, · · · , n} receives a private signal
si ∈ S, distributed independently conditional on the true state ω. A collective decision is
made by the majority rule. Upon receiving signal si, individual i casts a vote vi ∈ {0, 1},
and the collective decision is determined by the sign of (
∑
i vi − n/2).
We do not restrict the signal space S to be binary.18 We assume S ⊂ R so that S is an
ordered set, and we assume that the commonly known distribution satisfies the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP), that is, the posterior distribution Pr[ω = 1|si] is increasing
in si.
A strategic Condorcet Jury Theorem claims that asymptotic efficiency is obtained among
the rational individuals with homogeneous preferences and costless information acquisition,
as described above. More precisely, it claims that, under the Nash equilibrium behavior,
the probability of making a right decision converges to one as n goes to infinity. In the
following subsections we characterize the best response function and investigate whether the
asymptotic collective efficiency would be obtained under the cognitive hierarchy models in
which individuals may show systematic deviations from the Nash behavior.
3.1.1 Best response function
Suppose that the private signal of each voter is independently and identically drawn from
a normal distribution conditional on the true state: si ∼ N (ω, σ) . Since the distribution
satisfies the MLRP, the posterior belief is monotone with respect to the obtained signal.
Therefore, given the startegies taken by the other players, the best response of a voter is a
cutoff strategy, that is, voting for vi = 0 (resp. 1) if the obtained signal is smaller (resp.
larger) than a threshold. Let s¯ be the threshold in a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then,
the voter should be indifferent between voting for vi = 0 and 1 when she receives the signal
s¯. Since the expected payoff should be equal,
E [u˜ (ω, d) |vi = 1, s¯] = E [u˜ (ω, d) |vi = 0, s¯] . (4)
The expected payoffs differ only on the pivotal events. Suppose that n is odd and n = 2m+1
with an integer m. A voter is pivotal if the votes from the other players are split exactly to
17The assumption of symmetric prior is without loss of generality, since we allow the payoffs of the two
types of right decisions to be heterogeneous. Although the preferences are often represented by a loss function
for wrong decisions in the standard CJT models, we equivalently use a gain function for right decisions in
accordance with our experiment, which awards positive points to right decisions, rather than subtracting
points for wrong decisions.
18Even though a number of CJT models assume a binary signal space, we believe that this is not the right
assumption for information aggregation problems. Even under the binary state space, there are uncountably
many ways to update the prior belief, and thus the set of possible beliefs spans a continuous space. Assuming
the signal space to be binary implies that there are only two ways of Bayesian update, which is far from
innocuous.
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m votes for vi = 0 and 1. Therefore, (4) is equivalent to:
u˜ (1, 1) Pr [ω = 1|s¯, piv] = u˜ (−1,−1) Pr [ω = −1|s¯, piv]
⇔ q Pr [ω = 1, s¯, piv] = (1− q) Pr [ω = −1, s¯, piv]
⇔ q1
2
Pr [s¯, piv|ω = 1] = (1− q) 1
2
Pr [s¯, piv|ω = −1]
⇔ qφ
(
s¯− 1
σ
)(
2m
m
)(
Φ
(
s¯− 1
σ
))m(
1− Φ
(
s¯− 1
σ
))m
= (1− q)φ
(
s¯+ 1
σ
)(
2m
m
)(
Φ
(
s¯+ 1
σ
))m(
1− Φ
(
s¯+ 1
σ
))m
⇔ q
1− q
φ
(
s¯−1
σ
)
φ
(
s¯+1
σ
) = (Φ ( s¯+1σ ) (1− Φ ( s¯+1σ ))
Φ
(
s¯−1
σ
) (
1− Φ ( s¯−1
σ
)))m
where φ and Φ are respectively the pdf and the cdf of the standard normal distribution
N (0, 1). The left-hand side of the last line is increasing in s¯, taking values from 0 to ∞,
while the right-hand side is decreasing in s¯, taking values from∞ to 0. Hence, the symmetric
Nash equilibrium s¯ is uniquely defined for each (q, σ, n). For example, let q = 9/11, σ = 1.
For the values of n = 5, 9, 19, we have s¯ = −0.217, −0.126, −0.062, respectively.
Now, consider the best response function of player i. Suppose that all other players use
a strategy biased by b ∈ R with respect to the symmetric Nash equilibirum, that is, the
threshold is s¯+ b for all players other than i. Then, the best response of player i is given by:
q
1− q
φ
(
si−1
σ
)
φ
(
si+1
σ
) = (Φ ( s¯+b+1σ ) (1− Φ ( s¯+b+1σ ))
Φ
(
s¯+b−1
σ
) (
1− Φ ( s¯+b−1
σ
)))m
⇔ si = σ
2
2
log
(
1− q
q
(
Φ
(
s¯+b+1
σ
) (
1− Φ ( s¯+b+1
σ
))
Φ
(
s¯+b−1
σ
) (
1− Φ ( s¯+b−1
σ
)))m) .
We can verify that the right-hand side is decreasing in b. By letting bi = si − s¯, we can
rewrite the best response of player i as a function from b to bi.
The best response functions for different values of n are plotted in Figure 1. The model
parameters are chosen so that the game coincides with the one with asymmetric payoffs in
our experiments.19 We observe that the best response functions are fairly close to a linear
function. Our analysis using the linear quadratic game in this section can be applied to
this game to the extent that the second-order Taylor expansion approximates the payoff
functions. From the figure, we can expect that the approximation by a linear quadratic
game is sufficiently precise.
19The only difference is that the signals are normally distributed here, while they are discrete in the ex-
periments. This is due to the difficulty of describing normally distributed signal in the laboratory. Variances
are chosen to be the same. The Poisson coefficient is calibrated here as the average of the estimated values
obtained in the experimental analysis in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Best response function of player i, given the equal bias b by all other players.
Payoff parameter is q = 9/11. Normal signal N (ω, σ) with σ = 1.
We also observe from the figure that the slope is negative and it becomes steep as n
increases. The idea behind the monotonicity is that, when the same bias is added by all other
players, the best response of the player is to correct the total bias by going to the opposite
direction. When the signals are normally distributed, the total bias is well approximated
by simply adding all biases, which makes the best response approximately a linear function.
Since the absolute value of the slope increases without a bound as n becomes large, our game
falls in the class with A =∞.
3.1.2 Numerical comparison
In order to underline the differences implied by different behavioral assumptions, we provide
numerical computation results using the game described above. Our aim here is to highlight
numerically the behavioral consequences of the inclusiveness condition, by comparing the
individual strategies predicted by each model. Four different behavioral specifications are
compared: Nash equilibrium (NE), the level-k model (L), the cognitive hierarchy model
(CH), and the inclusive cognitive hierarchy model (ICH).
Table 2 shows the level-1 and level-2 strategies under the L, CH, ICH models, and the
Nash equilibrium, as a function of the group size n.20 In the L model, level-1 (L1) strategy
20 The level-0 strategy is set as σ0 = −5. See subsection 5.4 for a detailed discussion.
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n NE L1, CH1 L2 CH2 ICH1 ICH2
3 −0.345 14.5 −45.1 −1.651 −0.136 −0.321
5 −0.226 25.3 −128 −1.657 0.042 −0.204
7 −0.168 36.0 −254 −1.664 0.136 −0.149
9 −0.133 46.8 −423 −1.670 0.194 −0.117
11 −0.111 57.5 −635 −1.677 0.234 −0.096
13 −0.095 68.3 −890 −1.683 0.263 −0.081
15 −0.083 79.1 −1188 −1.690 0.285 −0.071
17 −0.073 89.8 −1529 −1.696 0.302 −0.062
19 −0.066 101 −1913 −1.703 0.316 −0.056
Table 2: Level-1 and level-2 strategies under the L, CH, ICH models, and the Nash equilib-
rium, as a function of the group size n, when the level-0 strategy is set as σ0 = −5.
diverges to infinity, while Level-2 (L2) diverges to minus infinity, exhibiting the expanding
nature of the best response function. In the CH model, the level-1 strategy (CH1) is the same
as in the L model, by definition. The level-2 strategy (CH2) is slightly decreasing, meaning
a divergence from the Nash behavior. In the ICH model, strategies are increasing in both
level-1 and level-2, in accordance with the Nash behavior. ICH2 strategy is converging to
the Nash equilibrium and ICH1 is not. We can observe that the ICH strategies are classified
asymptotically to the following types: intermediary (ICH1) and rational (ICH2), aside from
na¨ıve (L0). The numerical computations are coherent with the theoretical properties we
obtained above.
The numerical example suggests a contrast among the behavioral assumptions under our
consideration. In particular, it suggests that the inclusiveness condition plays a key role in
describing the asymptotic behavior. In what follows, we show the results from our stylized
laboratory experiment which provides statistical evidence for our scrutiny of the models.
4 Experimental Design
All of our computerized experimental sessions were held at the Ecole Polytechnique Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory.21 In total we had 140 actual participants in 7 sessions, in
addition to the pilot sessions with more than 60 participants. In each session, 20 partici-
pants took part in 4 phases (together with a short trial phase) which lasted about one hour
in total. Earnings were expressed in experimental currency units (ECUs) and exchanged for
cash, to be paid immediately following the session. Participants earned an average of about
21 Euros, including a default 5 Euros for participation. Complete instructions and details
21Both the z-Tree program (Fischbacher (2007)) and the website for participant registration were developed
by Sri Srikandan, to whom we are very much grateful.
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can be found in our online appendix.22 The instructions pertaining to the entire experiment
were read aloud at the beginning of each session. Before each phase, the changes from the
previous phase were read aloud, and an information sheet providing the relevant details of
the game was distributed. These sheets were exchanged with new ones before each phase.
We employed a within-subject design where each participant played all 4 phases con-
secutively in a session. Each phase contained 15 periods of play, and thus each participant
played for a total of 60 periods under a direct-response method. Since the question of our
research relates to the strategic aspects of group decisions, our experiment was presented to
participants as an abstract group decision-making task where neutral language was used to
avoid any reference to voting or elections of any sort.
In the beginning of each period, the computer randomly formed groups of participants, of
a size that was commonly known and predetermined for each phase (either n = 5, 9, or 19).23
Then, a box was shown to each participant with one hundred squares (to be referred as cards
from now on), all colorless (gray in z-Tree). At the same time, the unknown true color of
the box for each group was determined randomly by the computer. The participants were
informed that the color of the box would be either blue or yellow, with equal probability. It
was announced that the blue box contained 60 blue and 40 yellow cards, whereas the yellow
box contained 60 yellow and 40 blue cards.
After confirming to proceed to the next screen, 10 cards drawn by the computer with
random locations in the box were shown to the participants, this time with the true colors.
These draws were independent among all participants but were drawn from the same box
in the same group. Having observed the 10 randomly-drawn cards, the participants were
required to choose either blue or yellow by clicking on the corresponding button. Then,
the decision for the group was reached by majority rule, which was resolute every time,
since we only admitted odd numbers for group sizes and abstention was not allowed. Once
all participants in a group had made their choices, the true color of the box, the number
of members who chose blue, the number of members who chose yellow, and the earnings
for that period were revealed on the following screen. A new period started after everyone
confirmed.
In one of the four phases, the group size was set at n = 5 and the payoffs were symmetric.
Each participant earned 500 ECUs for any correct group decision (i.e., a blue decision when
true color of the box was blue, or a yellow decision when true color of the box was yellow).
In the case of an incorrect decision, no award was earned. In the other three phases, each
treatment differed only in the size of the groups (5, 9, or 19) where asymmetric payoffs
were fixed. The correct group decision when the true color of the box was blue awarded
22The online appendix can be found at http://sites.google.com/site/ozkesali.
23In the phase with n = 9, two groups of 9 randomly-chosen members were formed at each period. Having
20 participants in total in each session, 2 randomly-chosen participants were ‘on hold’ during the period. The
same method is applied in the phase with n = 19. A group of 19 was formed and thus one randomly-chosen
participant was on hold.
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each participant in the group with 900 ECUs, whereas the correct group decision when the
true color of the box was yellow awarded them with 200 ECUs.24 Lastly, we implemented a
random-lottery incentive system where the final payoffs at each phase were determined by
the payoffs from a randomly-drawn period.25
Let us underline that asymmetry in remuneration is introduced in our experiment in
order to observe the effect of a prior bias on the participants’ behavior. It is not surprising
that an informative strategy (i.e. voting for the choice favored by the signal), or one close to
it, is employed by a large majority of the participants under symmetric awards.26 When it is
commonly known that one of the alternatives may provide a larger award, in addition to the
change of the symmetric Nash equilibrium shifting towards the ex ante preferable alternative,
each individual’s behavior may shift, and furthermore, such shifts may be heterogeneous
across individuals. Consequentially, each individual may hold heterogeneous beliefs over
the strategies employed by the other individuals in the group. The accumulated effects of
such heterogeneous belief formation may hamper the performance of group decision-making,
which is one of our main concerns in this paper.
At the beginning of each session, as part of the instructions, participants played through
two mandatory trial periods. Each session concluded after a short questionnaire. According
to the anonymously-recorded questionnaire, 44% of the participants were female. The age
distribution was as follows: 31% between the age of 19 and 22, 26% between 23 and 29,
14% between 30 and 39, and 29% between 40 and 67. Heterogeneity in their professions was
relatively high: 46% administrative staff, 37% undergraduate students (“Polytechniciens”),
12% Ph.D. students, 1% master students, and 3% researchers. 6% of the participants had
previously taken an advanced course in game theory, while 14% had taken an introductory
course. 39% said that they had some notions about game theory, while 41% claimed to have
no knowledge of game theory.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Cutoff Strategies
Under our experimental design, a pure strategy of an individual is a function from the realized
signal to a binary vote. It is straightforward to show that the best reply of an individual,
given any belief on the strategies of other group members, is a cutoff strategy. There exists
24We also conducted pilot sessions with the rewards of 800 ECUs and 300 ECUs. As there was less of a
marked contrast in the observed deviations from Nash behavior, we decided to run the rest of the sessions
with the rewards 900 ECUs and 200 ECUs.
25Participants were told both verbally and through info sheets that in the case where the lottery picked a
period for remuneration in which a participant had been on hold, the payoff in that phase for this participant
was set at 500 ECUs, which is about the average of the winning points.
26Behaviors close to the informative strategy are indeed observed in our experiments with unbiased payoffs.
See histogram in Figure 3(a).
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a threshold for each individual such that she votes for blue if and only if her signal induces
a higher posterior probability of a blue state than the threshold. Since the posterior belief
over the two states varies monotonically as a function of the number of blue cards among
the 10 revealed ones, a cutoff strategy in our experiment is that each individual votes for
blue when the number of observed blue cards is higher than the cutoff value, and for yellow
otherwise. Special cases include voting for one of the colors regardless of the signal. The
cutoff value is considered as an extreme value (either 0 or 10) for such a behavior.
We have observed in our data that a majority of participants used a cutoff strategy with
randomization. Randomization occurs with two or more realized values of the signal, with the
degree of randomization varying monotonically in the right direction (i.e. a higher probability
of voting for blue given more blue cards in the signal). We regard such a behavior as a
consequence of decision-making with an error or other uncertainties which are not explicitly
formalized in the model.27
More precisely, let xi ∈ [0, 10] be the (continuous) cutoff strategy of voter i, and let
sti ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 10} be the (discrete) signal realized in period t, i.e. the number of blue
cards out of the ten revealed ones. We assume that the probability that i casts a vote
vti ∈ {0(yellow), 1(blue)} depends on the distance between the signal and the cutoff value,
following the logistic distribution:
ϕ
(
vti |sti, xi, εi
)
=
(exp εi (s
t
i − xi))v
t
i
1 + exp εi (sti − xi)
(5)
where εi is the error coefficient. As ϕ pins down a distribution over voting profiles (vi)
n
i=1,
the social decision d made by the simple majority rule is a function of the realized signals
s = (si)
n
i=1, cutoff values x = (xi)
n
i=1, and the error coefficients ε = (εi)
n
i=1. Hence, for fixed
ε, we can write the expected payoff as a function of the cutoff strategy profile x ∈ [0, 10]n:28
u (x) = Eω,s [u˜ (ω, d (s, x, ε))] .
Let T be the set of periods under consideration. Provided the observation (sti, v
t
i)t∈T , our
estimation of the cutoff strategies is obtained by maximizing the likelihood:
L
((
sti, v
t
i
)
t∈T
∣∣∣xi, εi) = ∏
t∈T
ϕ
(
vti |sti, xi, εi
)
.
In Figure 2, histograms of the estimated cutoff values are shown for each phase. Several
remarks are in order. First, we see a clear shift in the distribution from the symmetric
27In the post-experiment questionnaire, a few participants expressed reasonings which seemed to have no
clear connection with any Bayesian update, such as “I chose yellow when I saw three or more yellow cards
aligned in a row, since I thought it was a strong sign that the box is yellow.” We assume that such deviations
from rationality are accounted for by the error term.
28Technically, we can extend the strategy space beyond the interval [0, 10], given our specification of the
errors in (5). However, we chose not to do so, as the main intuition of the model is unchanged, and we prefer
to avoid any possible confusion caused by a cutoff value defined outside of the signal space.
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payoffs to the asymmetric ones. Most notably, for each of the group sizes of 5, 9 and
19 with asymmetric payoffs, a peak in the frequencies is clearly visible on the intervals
[0, 1), representing 6%, 9% and 9% of all cutoff values, respectively. As the cutoff value 0
corresponds to the behavior of voting for blue regardless of the obtained signal, the presence
of the peaks suggests that a certain amount of participants used the signal-independent
voting strategy, or at least one close to it. Second, about half of the estimated cutoff values
are included in the interval [4, 5) with asymmetric payoffs. The percentages in this interval
for group sizes of 5, 9, and 19 are 54%, 51%, and 66%, respectively. Note that the unbiased
strategy is represented by the cutoff value of 5. A cutoff value lower than 5 corresponds to
a strategy biased in favor of voting for blue, the ex ante optimal choice. According to our
estimation, roughly between one half and two thirds of participants used a cutoff strategy
slightly biased towards the ex ante optimal choice. Third, no single player used a cutoff
strategy higher than 8 in any phase with asymmetric payoffs. It is worth underlining that
no signal-independent voting behavior to the other extreme direction (i.e. a cutoff value of
10, which corresponds to voting regardless of the signal for yellow, the ex ante suboptimal
alternative) is observed with asymmetric payoffs. Fourth, a non-negligible amount of voting
behaviors in favor of yellow are observed, even though they are rather a minority. The
frequencies of cutoff values higher than 5 are 15%, 17% and 9%, respectively, in the three
phases with asymmetric payoffs.
5.2 Robustness Check
Among the robustness checks we carried out, two of them are worth mentioning. First,
we checked whether learning over the periods occurred. During each period t, what we
observe for each individual i is only one realized signal sti and the casted vote v
t
i . Therefore,
a cutoff estimation requires a pool of observations over periods. We checked estimations
over different intervals of periods: T = {1, · · · , 15}, {1, · · · , 10}, {6, · · · , 15}, {1, · · · , 7},
{9, · · · , 15}, {1, · · · , 5}, {6, · · · , 10}, and {11, · · · , 15}. The t-tests do not reject the null
hypothesis for any pairs of intervals at the p = 0.10 level, suggesting that no change in
strategy occurred over time, ruling out the possibility of learning. We thus conclude that the
estimation is robust including observations over all 15 periods. We also counted the number
of votes consistent with the cutoff estimation obtained from T = {1, · · · , 15}. Overall,
90.3% of actions are consistent. Inconsistent actions are spread across periods, and the
t-statistics of the comparison between the first and last 7 periods are 1.06, 1.32 and 1.39
for the number of inconsistent blue actions, yellow actions and the sum, respectively, none
statistically significant at the p = 0.10 level.
We also tested different assumptions on εi: (i) common across phases for each individual,
(ii) common across individuals for each phase and session, (iii) common across individuals
and sessions for each phase, and (iv) common for individuals, sessions and phases. Comparing
the estimated cutoff values between any pair of different assumptions on εi, the R
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Figure 2: Histogram of the estimated cutoff strategies, given 140 observations, together with
average values.
the 6 pairs are respectively, 0.90, 0.89, 0.89, 0.99, 0.99 and 0.99, implying that the estimation
is robust. In the following, we use the estimated cutoff values under assumption (iii), as our
main concern here is the change in subjects’ behavior as a function of the group size.
5.3 The model fit
In what follows, we evaluate three models: level-k (L), cognitive hierarchy (CH), and inclusive
cognitive hierarchy (ICH), estimating the parameters which fit best to our experimental data.
Our aim is to find out the sequence of level strategies σ = (σ1, · · · , σK) and the level
distribution f = (f0, · · · , fK), which best fits the observed cutoff values (xi)i∈N , provided an
exogenously fixed level-0 strategy σ0.
29 Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption
that f follows the truncated Poisson distribution with coefficient τ . Estimation of the level
29Remember that K is the highest level under consideration. Our estimation sets K = 2 due to a heavy
computational burden for K ≥ 3 and large n.
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distribution f thus boils down to finding the best-fitting τ .
We assume that the observed cutoff values (xi)i∈N are drawn from the distribution∑K
k=0 fkσk with a logistic error. More precisely, the probability that the realized cutoff
strategy is xi is:
φ (xi|f, σ, ρ) =
K∑
k=0
fkEy [` (xi|y, ρ)|σk] ,
where expectation over y is drawn from the distribution σk,
30 and
` (xi|y, ρ) =
exp
(
xi−y
ρ
)
ρ
(
1 + exp
(
xi−y
ρ
))2
is the density function of the logistic distribution with mean y and the error coefficient ρ.
Our estimation maximizes the likelihood, choosing the Poisson distribution f and the error
coefficient ρ: ∏
i∈N
φ (xi|f, σ, ρ) .
Given σ0, the variables to be estimated are thus τ and ρ.
5.4 Level-0 Strategy
Before proceeding to the comparison of the models, we briefly discuss the choice of the
level-0 strategy, which can be supported by the idea of saliency. As discussed in Crawford
and Iriberri (2007a), inter alia, some naturally occurring landscapes that are focal across
the strategy space may constitute salient non-strategic features of a game and attract na¨ıve
assessments.31 For instance, a strategy space represented by a real interval, say [m,M ], may
have its minimal point m, its maximal point M , and its midpoint m+M
2
as salient locations.
In our game, two of these deserve close attention. First, if we expect that a non-strategic,
level-0 player would evaluate her choices while disregarding others’ strategic incentives, such
a behavior corresponds to a strategy of the ex ante favored choice, i.e. always voting for blue.
A salient location would then be 0. Second, if we expect that a non-strategic player would
choose a strategy which maximizes the probability of making a right decision regardless of
the winning point (and thus is not payoff-maximizing), then a salient strategy is the midpoint
5. Furthermore, a uniform randomization over all available pure strategies is often chosen
as the level-0 strategy in the literature (see discussion in Camerer et al. (2004)).
Table 3 provides a comparison based on the maximum likelihood estimation described in
the previous subsection, under the ICH model with the group size n = 5. We used a grid
30σk could be a mixed strategy, as is often assumed for k = 0.
31We abstract from cognitive foundations that might raise the issue of “strategic awareness” as in Fehr and
Huck (2016), as we do not have data on subjects’ cognitive abilities.
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τ ∗ ρ∗ ICH1 (σ1) ICH2 (σ2) LL
σ0 = 0 3.9 2.5 4.45 4.28 −190.7
σ0 = 5 10 1.6 4.17 4.23 −222.9
σ0 = 10 10 1.6 3.84 4.21 −225.6
σ0 = U [0, 10] 4.3 2.3 4.00 4.20 −213.3
Table 3: Comparison of level-0 specifications for n = 5, together with the maximum log-
likelihood attained under the ICH model.
search, with both τ and ρ varied from 0.1 to 10 with an increment of 0.1. Among the four
salient strategies of σ0 we specified above, the highest log-likelihood is attained at σ0 = 0,
followed by the uniform distribution, with the lowest at σ0 = 5 and 10.
32 Note that the
estimated τ ∗ hits the upper bound grid value 10 for σ0 = 5 and 10. Provided the Poisson
assumption imposed on f , a high value of τ ∗ means that the model can best fit the data by
assigning the largest possible probability to the highest level-K (and the smallest to level-0).
Therefore, one can expect at best the model to provide as a good fit as the symmetric Nash
equilibrium. We thus conclude that setting such values of the level-0 strategy is of limited
interest for describing the deviation from rational behavior, since these values of σ0 can
provide only a limited capacity of explaining our data beyond the Nash model.33 Between
the uniform σ0 and σ0 = 0, the latter fits better, which is coherent with the observations
from our experiments with asymmetric payoffs that (i) there is a peak at 0 for all n, and
(ii) no single player used a cutoff strategy higher than 8 in any phase. In what follows,
we continue our analysis by setting the level-0 strategy to be σ0 = 0. It is important to
note that, this choice is made independently from how ICH performs with respect to other
models. As seen in Table 4, ICH performs better than L and CH, regardless of the choice
of level-0, as the lowest maximum log-likelihood obtained by ICH is higher than the highest
maximum log-likelihood obtained by L or CH.
σ0 = 0 5 10 U [0, 10]
L −415.3 −243.8 −438.6 −340.6
CH −366.4 −241.2 −304.3 −240.4
ICH −190.7 −222.9 −225.6 −213.3
Table 4: Comparison of maximum log-likelihoods obtained for different level-0 specifications
with n = 5. The cases n = 9 and n = 19 are in Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix C.
32This holds for n = 9 as well, whereas for n = 19, the ICH model with uniform random level-0 performs
better than 0 (see Table 8 in Appendix C).
33Similarly, we observed that τ∗ hits the boundary value at σ0 = 5 and σ0 = 10 for n = 9 and n = 19,
as well as under the L and the CH models, which implies that the prediction power of the models is quite
limited under the assumption of σ0 = 5 or σ0 = 10.
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5.5 Results
Table 5 summarizes the comparison of the models by maximum likelihood estimation.
τ ∗ ρ∗ σ1 σ2 LL
L 0.1 0.4 10 0 −415.3
n = 5 CH 8.0 0.6 10 1.76 −366.4
ICH 3.9 2.5 4.45 4.28 −190.7
L 0.1 0.4 10 0 −416.3
n = 9 CH 10.0 0.7 10 2.52 −334.3
ICH 5.0 2.3 4.91 4.67 −210.6
L 0.1 0.4 10 0 −414.8
n = 19 CH 9.1 0.7 10 2.40 −338.0
ICH 6.7 2.4 5.11 4.84 −210.7
Table 5: Comparison of the models by maximum log-likelihood, using 140 observations,
under the assumption σ0 = 0. Grid search is run for both the Poisson coefficient τ and the
error coefficient ρ, from 0.1 to 10 with an increment of 0.1.
5.5.1 Level-k Model
An Lk player (level-k player in the L model) maximizes her payoff holding a belief that
all other individuals play the L(k − 1) strategy. Since each individual has an incentive of
correcting biases caused by all other players, the best reply of a Lk player is biased toward
the opposite direction with respect to the Nash equilibrium as compared to the L(k − 1)
strategy, and the degree of amplification increases as n increases.34 We see in Table 5 that
the cutoff strategy of the L1 player hits σ1 = 10 as a response to the L0 strategy σ0 = 0 for
all values of n = 5, 9, and 19. A similar argument applies to L2 in the opposite direction,
implying σ2 = 0. Such an oscillation continues in the L model, and a bang-bang solution is
obtained perpetually as k increases.
For all n, we observe that the most likely value τ ∗ hits the lower bound 0.1. This is
not surprising, given the bang-bang strategies σ1 = 10 and σ0 = σ2 = 0. As the truncated
Poisson density of level 1, g2(1) =
τ
1+τ+τ2/2
, is minimized at τ = 0, the model fits best to the
data observed in Figure 2, at the lowest value of τ .
34Note that the best reply is always well-defined, since the probability of being pivotal is always non-zero,
given the probabilistic voting action of each player specified by the logistic error function (5).
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5.5.2 CH Model
The CH model stipulates that a CHk player (a level-k player in the CH model) maximizes
her expected payoff holding a belief that other n − 1 players have levels up to k − 1. In
particular, a CH1 player holds the belief that all other players have level 0, which is exactly
the same as the belief of an L1 player. In our game, the CH1 strategy is σ1 = 10 for all
n = 5, 9 and 19.
In Table 5, we observe that the values of τ ∗ are high for all n. This means that the
best-fitting Poisson distribution assigns the highest density to level 2. Since the CH model
attributes the corner values σ0 = 0 and σ1 = 10 for levels 0 and 1, the model fits to the
data by assigning minimal densities to these corner strategies. We do not observe either a
particular trend in τ ∗, or a convergence of the CH2 strategies to Nash equilibrium, as n
increases.35 A key observation is an increasing sensitivity of the CH2 strategy for large n.
Not only is the best-reply function in our game decreasing, but the slope of the best-reply
function becomes steeper as n increases. Thus, the sensitivity of the best reply to the belief
over the other players’ strategies also increases as n increases. As we show in Theorem 1,
such an increasing sensitivity leads to a divergence of the CH strategy in asymptotically
expanding games, as n increases.
5.5.3 ICH Model
We observe that the estimated strategies of ICH1 and ICH2 are both increasing in n.36
Comparing these values with the Nash equilibrium, the increase of both ICH1 and ICH2 is
in line with the increase of the Nash equilibrium strategy with respect to n (Table 2). The
intuition is that the Nash strategy monotonically converges to the unbiased strategy (i.e.
5), since all individuals equally share the prior bias caused by the asymmetric payoffs, and
such an individual share converges to zero as n increases. As we discuss in Section 3, ICH1
would converge to a value opposite to the prior bias with respect to the Nash equilibrium,
and ICH2 would approach to the Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1). Our ICH estimations from
the data are consistent with these theoretical predictions.
The estimated values of τ ∗ are 3.9, 5.0 and 6.7, for n = 5, 9 and 19, respectively. For
these values of τ , it is interesting to compute the probability assigned to their own level by
an inclusive player. For a level-2 player, it is g2(2) =
τ2/2
1+τ+τ2/2
, which is equal to 61%, 68%
35As a robustness check, the session-wise estimation shows that the difference of σ2 is not statistically
significant between n = 5 and n = 9. We observe that an increase from n = 9 to n = 19 is significant at
the p = 0.10 level by the t-test, although such an increase is not observed in the histogram of all estimated
strategies in Figure 2.
36This observation is robust with the session-wise estimations. The differences are statistically significant
at the p = 0.01 level under the Wilcoxon test. The t-statistics for ICH1 are 13.9 and 6.94, and for ICH2
are 9.65 and 9.74, from n = 5 to n = 9 and from n = 9 to n = 19, respectively, implying that all differences
are statistically significant at the p = 0.01 level.
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and 74%, respectively. For a level-1 player, it is g1(1) =
τ
1+τ
, which is equal to 80%, 83%
and 87%, respectively. These values are consistent with the responses we observed in Figure
3(b).
Another observation is that the best-fitting τ values are increasing as the group size
increases. Given that τ is the expectation of the level drawn from the Poisson distribution,
a larger τ corresponds, ceteris paribus, to a higher value in the expected cognitive levels.
Therefore, an increase in the estimated values of τ may be interpreted as evidence that
the average cognitive level increases as the group size grows larger. This observation is not
consistent with the findings of Guarnaschelli et al. (2000), in which evidence of lower expected
levels with larger groups is reported, reflecting a larger cognitive load in large groups.
5.5.4 Comparison
Our maximum likelihood estimations show that the ICH model best fits the data for all
n = 5, 9 and 19. The result is robust for the estimations done by each session separately:
the log-likelihood is improved under the ICH model and the differences are significant under
the Wilcoxon test (p < 0.001) against CH. From the observations above, we conclude that our
laboratory experiments provide clear evidence that the inclusive cognitive hierarchy model
(ICH) fits better to the data as compared with the standard level-k model (L) and the
cognitive hierarchy model (CH).
Nash equilibrium does not seem to explain aggregate behavior. To see this note that the
equilibrium cutoff strategy increases with group size, whereas as seen in Figure 2, average
observed cutoffs decrease with group size. Our data also provides us with statistics that allow
a comparison of the fits between the above models and Nash equilibrium plus noise (Table
6). The Bayesian information criterion suggests that the ICH model fits better than Nash
equilibrium, followed by the L and CH models. Our observation that Nash equilibrium fits
better than the L and CH models is consistent with the findings of Battaglini et al. (2010)
in an experiment on the swing voter’s curse.
n = 5 9 19
NE −222.9 −246.2 −244.2
ICH −190.7 −210.6 −210.7
Table 6: Comparison of maximum log-likelihoods obtained for ICH and NE (with logistic
errors ρ∗ = 1.6, 1.3 and 1.3, for n = 5, 9 and 19, respectively).
We now briefly discuss the QRE approach. We argue that, since the best response of a
player is a cutoff strategy in our experimental game, the expected payoffs should be single-
peaked around the best response, when the belief over other players’ strategies is perturbed.
Thus, the QRE strategy would also be a single-peaked distribution around the best reply,
similar to our Nash with logistic error model. Hence, considering QRE would not add much
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more than our Nash estimations. Also, equilibrium-plus-noise models such as QRE often miss
systematic patterns in participants’ deviations from equilibrium such as the one observed in
our experimental data. We are aware that there are ways of embedding heterogeneities
that resonate with thinking hierarchies into QRE approach, as in the case of the “truncated
quantal response equilibrium”(TQRE) due to Rogers et al. (2009). However, the relationship
and comparison of ICH and TQRE (or other QRE specifications) are beyond the scope of
this paper and would be a possible future work.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a cognitive hierarchy model which allows inclusiveness in the belief over
the cognitive levels of other players. We find that asymptotic properties of the group decision-
making, especially asymptotic efficiency, exhibit a stark contrast depending on whether the
inclusiveness condition is admitted in the model or not. Results from our laboratory experi-
ment provide evidence for (i) systematic deviations from Nash equilibrium behavior, and (ii)
a better fit to the data under the model with inclusiveness.
Our theoretical analysis implies that the asymptotic property of the slope of the best-
reply function is the key ingredient to determining whether the asymptotic properties differ
between the models with and without inclusiveness. Even with an increasing sensitivity of
the best-reply function to the beliefs, inclusiveness prevents divergence of the strategies from
fully rational behavior. Since the same property is shared by the best-reply function of the
collective decision-making studied in this paper, the presence of the inclusiveness prevents
strategies from diverging away from the symmetric Nash equilibrium, and hence provides
asymptotic efficiency as the group size increases.
Most of the games studied with cognitive hierarchy models share the property that the
best-reply function is asymptotically non-expansive (i.e. A <∞). In such games, our anal-
ysis implies that the presence of inclusiveness has little relevance, at least asymptotically.
Therefore, inclusiveness does not imperil the insights obtained in the existing cognitive hier-
archy models, even though its explanatory power may vary as a function of model settings
and parameters. A major example is the classical Keynesian beauty contest game. The data
provides us with evidence that the model with inclusiveness fits the data toward the same
direction as those without inclusiveness. Similar insights are inherited in the games with
best-reply functions that are ‘contractive’ in a broader sense, such as dominance-solvable
games, coordination games, and market entry games, among others. We hence do not insist
on an intrinsic improvement of the predictive power of the cognitive hierarchy model with
the presence of the inclusiveness condition in this class of games. The main message of this
paper is that there are games in the other class in which the presence of inclusiveness mat-
ters. We think there are interesting games in this class, e.g. Cournot competitions, that are
worth pursuing in further analysis.
Our interests go beyond the analytical results obtained in this paper. A crucial differ-
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ence induced by the presence of inclusiveness is the existence of ‘sophisticated’ players. A
highest-level player in the ICH model best replies holding the correct belief concerning the
distribution of the levels of other players. This is not the case in the cognitive hierarchy mod-
els without inclusiveness. Players are supposed to be Savage rational, but full consistency of
their beliefs is not postulated even for the highest level. In that sense, simply the existence of
fully-sophisticated players may suffice to convey our message. However, our model consists
of players who are na¨ıve (level-0), best-replying but with inconsistent beliefs (level-1), and
sophisticated (level-2). Rubinstein (2016) proposes a typology of players with two types, e.g.
“instinctive” and “contemplative”. The three types emerging from our approach based on
cognitive hierarchy theory can be seen as a richer typology in the same vein that allows for
an intermediary type. And our experiments show that these intermediary types can indeed
be necessary, as a significant number of subjects play cutoff strategies that are higher than
5 (symmetric strategy), which can only be explained as a response to the belief that other
players will be overly biased towards blue. The beauty of the cognitive hierarchy models
lies, we believe, in the heterogeneous degrees of belief inconsistency that can be explicitly
accommodated. We would like to further understand the role of heterogeneous degrees of
inconsistent beliefs under the existence of fully-sophisticated players. We leave this for future
research.
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(a) “When you made decisions, did you think that
the other participants in your group used exactly
the same reasoning as you did?”
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(b) “What is the percentage of the other partici-
pants using the same reasoning, according to your
estimation?”
Figure 3: Responses in the post-experimental questionnaire.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let ai, bi, pi ∈ R for i = 1, · · ·n. Suppose that bi < 0, pi > 0, ai/bi < 1 for all i
and
∑
i pi = 1. Then, (
∑
i piai) / (
∑
i pibi) < 1.
Proof : ∀i, ai > bi. Since pi > 0,
∑
i piai >
∑
i pibi. Since the RHS is negative, we have the
result. 
The following is the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof : Fix any k ≥ 1 and suppose that the statement is true up to k − 1. By definition,
σk solves
max
xi
Ex−i [u (xi, x−i)] . (6)
By Assumption 3 and by linearity of expectation, the second-order partial derivative
∂2
∂x2i
{
Ex−i [u (xi, x−i)]
}
is strictly negative ∀xi. Hence, the first-order partial derivative is
strictly decreasing in xi. Again by Assumption 3, the first-order derivative should satisfy the
following inequalities at the boundary:
∂
∂xi
{
Ex−i [u (x, x−i)]
}
> 0 and
∂
∂xi
{
Ex−i [u (x, x−i)]
}
< 0.
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Therefore, the solution of (6) is uniquely determined by the first-order condition:
∂
∂xi
{
Ex−i [u (xi, x−i)]
}
= 0. (7)
In particular, the solution is unique when x−i is deterministic. Now, let ϕ (x−i) be the
unique solution of ∂u
∂xi
(xi, x−i) = 0 for a fixed x−i. Pick one j 6= i and consider ∂ϕ∂xj . As ϕ is
defined by an implicit function, its derivate should satisfy:
∂ϕ
∂xj
= −
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
∂2u
∂x2i
.
By Assumptions 3 and 4, we have ∂ϕ
∂xj
< 1
n−1 ∀x−i. In other words, if we fix one j (6= i) and
increase xj by a small amount δ, the solution ϕ (x−i) “increases at most δ/ (n− 1).”37
Now, suppose that among n − 1 players other than i, m (∈ {0, · · · , n− 1}) of them use
the strategy xˆ ∈ R, while the rest of them use a strategy profile x˜ ∈ Rn−1−m. That is, the
strategy profile including player i is
xi, xˆ, · · · , xˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈Rm
, x˜︸︷︷︸
∈Rn−1−m
 . For such a profile,
−
∂2u
∂xi∂xˆ
∂2u
∂x2i
= −
m ∂
2u
∂xi∂xj
∂2u
∂x2i
<
m
n− 1 < 1. (8)
In other words, if any number of players other than i increase simultaneously their strategies
by the same, small amount δ, the solution for xi increases at most δ.
Remember that the expectation over each xj (j 6= i) in (6) is taken independently across j
according to i’s belief, which assigns probabilities that sum up to 1−gk (k) to a combination
of (σh)
k−1
k=0, and probability gk (k) to σk. We now consider the change in the solution of (6)
caused by the change in σk, fixing gk (k) and (σh)
k−1
k=0. Let ψ (σk) be the solution, which
is well-defined since (7) has a unique solution. By using ψ, the ICH startegy σk can be
described as the solution of the fixed-point problem σk = ψ (σk).
Among n − 1 players other than i, let m be the number of players for whom the re-
alization of the random variable xj coincides with σk (which happens with probability(
n−1
m
)
gk (k)
m (1− gk (k))n−1−m). Then by (8), for each of such a realization, we have:
−
∂2u
∂xi∂σk
∂2u
∂x2i
< 1.
Now, since ψ (σk) is the unique solution of (7), we have:
dψ
dσk
= −
Ex−i
[
∂2
∂xi∂σk
u (xi, x−i)
]
Ex−i
[
∂2
∂x2i
u (xi, x−i)
] .
37The partial derivative can take any negative value, while it is less than 1/(n − 1) for positive values.
Hence, by this expression, we mean that ϕ may decrease.
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By Lemma 1, we have dψ
dσk
< 1. Therefore, the fixed-point problem σk = ψ (σk) has a unique
solution.
Finally, by induction, σk is uniquely determined for all k. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof : Let
αn := −γ12
γ11
(n− 1) .
By (3), αn is the slope of the best-reply function with respect to the average of the other
players’ strategies. Using αn, we can explicitly write the level-k strategy under each of
the three models, L, CH, and ICH. Note that these models differ only in the belief held
by each player, specified in equations (L), (CH) and (ICH) in Section 2.38 By definition,
limn→∞ |αn| = A.
In the L model, the strategy of the level-(k + 1) player is defined as the best reply to the
level-k player. By (3) and (L),
σLk+1 (n) = αnσ
L
k (n) for k ≥ 0.
Hence,
σLk (n) = (αn)
k µ for k ≥ 1.
Therefore, for any µ 6= 0 and any k ≥ 1, we have limn→∞
∣∣σLk (n)∣∣ = ∞ if A = ∞, and
bounded if A <∞.
In the CH model, by (3) and (CH),
σCHk (n) = αn
(
k−1∑
h=0
gCHk (h)σ
CH
h (n)
)
. (9)
Especially, σCH1 (n) = αnµ. For the sake of induction, assume that σ
CH
h (n) is a polynomial
of degree h with respect to αn for h ≤ k−1. Then, by (9), σCHk (n) is a polynomial of degree
k with respect to αn. Therefore, we have:
σCHk (n) = ϕk (αn)µ
where ϕk (·) is a polynomial of degree k. Therefore, for any µ 6= 0 and any k ≥ 1, we have
limn→∞
∣∣σCHk (n)∣∣ =∞ if A =∞, and bounded if A <∞.
38In the proof, we write the (possibly mixed) strategy of a level-0 player as σ0 = µ, identifying it with
its expected value, since expectation is the only relevant term which determines the best reply in the linear
quadratic games.
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In the ICH model, by (3) and (ICH),
σICHk (n) = αn
(
k∑
h=0
gICHk (h)σ
ICH
h (n)
)
.
Hence,
σICHk (n) =
αn
∑k−1
h=0 g
ICH
k (h)σ
ICH
h (n)
1− αngICHk (k)
. (10)
Now, suppose A =∞. For k = 1,
σICH1 (n) =
αng
ICH
1 (0)σ0
1− αngICH1 (1)
.
As limn→∞ |αn| =∞, we have limn→∞ σICH1 = −g
ICH
1 (0)
gICH1 (1)
µ = −f0
f1
µ.39
For k = 2, by (10),
σICH2 (n) =
αn
(
gICH2 (0)σ0 + g
ICH
2 (1)σ
ICH
1 (n)
)
1− αngICH2 (2)
.
As limn→∞ |αn| =∞, we have:
lim
n→∞
σICH2 (n) = −
gICH2 (0)µ+ g
ICH
2 (1)
(
−f0
f1
µ
)
gICH2 (2)
.
Since
gICH2 (0)
gICH2 (1)
= f0
f1
, we have limn→∞ σICH2 (n) = 0. For k > 2,
lim
n→∞
σICHk (n)
= lim
n→∞
(∑k−1
h=0 g
ICH
k (h)σ
ICH
h (n)
1
αn
− gICHk (k)
)
= − 1
gICHk (k)
(
gICHk (0)µ+ g
ICH
k (1)
(
−f0
f1
µ
)
+
k−1∑
h=2
gICHk (h) lim
n→∞
σICHh (n)
)
.
The first two terms in the bracket cancel out, since
gICHk (0)
gICHk (1)
= f0
f1
. For the sake of induction,
assume limn→∞ σICHh (n) = 0 for 2 ≤ h ≤ k − 1. Then, limn→∞ σICHk (n) = 0. 
39Remember that gk is the truncated distribution induced by f , the underlying distribution over levels
defined in Definition 1.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof : Suppose A <∞. Then by (10), for k ≥ 1,
lim
n→∞
σICHk (n) =
A
∑k−1
h=0 g
ICH
k (h)σ
ICH
h (n)
1− AgICHk (k)
.
Especially, for k = 1,
lim
n→∞
σICH1 (n) =
AgICH1 (0)µ
1− AgICH1 (1)
<∞.
For the sake of induction, assume limn→∞
∣∣σICHh (n)∣∣ =: sh < ∞ for 1 ≤ h ≤ k − 1. Then,
for k ≥ 2,
lim
n→∞
∣∣σICHk (n)∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣A
∑k−1
h=0 g
ICH
k (h) sh
1− AgICHk (k)
∣∣∣∣∣ <∞.

C Tables
σ0 = 0 5 10 U [0, 10]
L −416.3 −252.9 −438.6 −342.4
CH −334.4 −253.9 −288.9 −286.1
ICH −210.6 −250.3 −250.6 −217.4
Table 7: Comparison of maximum log-likelihoods obtained for different level-0 specifications
with n = 9.
σ0 = 0 5 10 U [0, 10]
L −414.8 −242.3 −438.8 −342.0
CH −338.0 −247.8 −250.5 −306.2
ICH −210.7 −248.1 −247.1 −195.1
Table 8: Comparison of maximum log-likelihoods obtained for different level-0 specifications
with n = 19.
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